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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tesha Jowane Sunday appeals from her convictions by a jury for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
As a result of a search warrant executed by the Caldwell Police Department on 
Paul Reid's Caldwell, Idaho, residence in conjunction with a check forgery case, the 
state charged Sunday with possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession 
of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6, 46-47.) At trial, a jury 
convicted Sunday of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, but acquitted her of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. (R., pp.99-
100.) Sunday filed a motion for an order for a mistrial, or in the alternative, a motion for 
a new trial (R., pp.107-119), which were both denied (R., pp.142-145, 152-176). The 
district court sentence Sunday to a unified term of six years with two and one-half years 
fixed, all suspended, and placed her on probation for six years. (R., pp.193-196.) 
Sunday timely appealed. (R., pp.197-200.) 
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ISSUES 
Sunday states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support Ms. Sunday's conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)? 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to provide Ms. Sunday's requested jury 
instructions? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts finding 
Sunday guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug 
paraphernalia? 
2. Has Sunday failed to show any error in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury 
as she requested? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support The Jury's Verdicts Finding 
Sunday Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine And Possession Of Drug 
Paraphernalia 
A. Introduction 
Sunday argues on appeal that the jury's verdict finding her guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia was not supported by adequate evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-11.) Sunday specifically claims "the State failed to establish that 
[she] had knowledge of the presence of methamphetamine, let alone constructively 
possessed it, that was discovered in a closed cigarette pack found in the master 
bedroom of the house." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Sunday's argument fails because there 
was substantial evidence presented at trial showing she possessed or constructively 
possessed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will not substitute its view 
for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. 
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Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108 
Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be considered 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 
P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-684, 99 P.3d at 1073-
1074. 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury's Verdict That Sunday Had Constructive 
Possession Of Methamphetamine And Drug Paraphernalia 
An "appellate court's function is not to weigh and consider the contradictions and 
inconsistencies which appellant finds in the testimony, but rather to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict of the jury, taking the view of the 
evidence most favorable to the sustained party." State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 292, 
668 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Ct. App. 1983). Actual possession requires possession and the 
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 
240-241, 985 P.2d 117, 120-121 (1999). Constructive possession "exists where a 
nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise 
to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, 
had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance." State v. 
Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, even if 
there is no evidence directly showing that Sunday possessed methamphetamine, that 
fact alone is not a basis for setting aside the jury's verdict. The relevant inquiry is 
4 
limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the jury's 
verdict that Sunday knew about the presence of the methamphetamine and pipe in the 
Camel cigarette carton, and either had physical control of it or the power and intention 
to exercise dominion and control over it. (See Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-15; ICJI 421.) The 
record reveals there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Sunday 
was guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
On April 6, 2010, at about 9:30 a.m., Caldwell Police Department officers 
executed a search warrant upon the residence of Paul Reid in regarding to a check 
forgery case. (Tr., vol. 1, p.125, L.18 - p.126, L.16; p.146, L.21 - p.147, L.12; p.197, 
L.5 - p.198, L.18.) There were six or seven people in the residence, including Sunday, 
when the officers entered the home. (Tr., vol. 1, p.208, Ls.2-4.) While other officers 
searched the residence, Officer Brockbank spoke to Sunday as she sat on a couch in 
the living room, and she told him that she had been staying in the master bedroom for a 
few days, and when he asked her if she had any clothes or any items in the house, she 
said she had some belongings in the master bedroom. (Tr., vol. 1, p.200, L.6 - p.201, 
L.1; p.205, Ls.12-15; p.209, Ls.14-16; p.215, L.25 - p.216, L.2; see State's Ex. 1 
(showing what appears to be one or more items of female intimate apparel).) When 
Officer Brockbank later went into the master bedroom, he saw some women's clothing 
in the closet. (Tr., vol. 1, p.205, L.22 - p.206, L.11.) He also found a document (State's 
Ex. 128) "hanging in the living room area, kind of common area of the house[,]" (Tr., vol. 
2, p.72, Ls.2-7) which reads: 
I am sorry 4 be a true homie. 
(1) everyone who is a close friend to me please listen up I'm sorry that 
we keep butting heads. 
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(2) Please forgive me for not wanting to get fuck on anything I do with 
cash I just want to check. 
(3) Sorry I took you off the streets and helped you out cause im a nice 
guy 
(4) Sorry be shearing all my cash, food, drugs, house and love with 
you! 
(5) Sorry 4 giving a shit and every chance I get to make you smile and 
happy! 
(6) Sorry 4 throwing you cash and the fucking helppen hand that made 
us homie! 
All because I take one fucking day to myself and 
some new friend and you act like I killed your mom 
Sorry but fuck you and get real and Im sorry 
(State's Ex. 12B (verbatim).) 
Detective Pittz searched the master bedroom, the master bedroom bathroom, 
and the master bedroom closet. (Tr., vol. 1, p.127, Ls.12-16.) On the bed was a 
woman's purse and a wallet sitting next to it with an Idaho Identification Card for 'Tesha 
Sunday." (Tr., vol. 1, p.128, Ls.6-8; p.131, Ls.13-18; see State's Ex. 5.) There were 
two fold-out camp type chairs sitting next to the bed with an end table in between them. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.128, L.13 - p.129, L.25; p.134, Ls.10-13; see State's Ex. 1.) In the cup 
holder of one of the camp chairs was a Camel cigarette pack, about two feet from the 
identification card, which contained a small bindle of methamphetamine and a pipe 
similar to those commonly used to smoke methamphetamine. (Tr., vol. 1, p.128, L.13 -
p.130, L.17; p.134, Ls.10-13; vol. 2, p.34, L.10 - p.37, L.13; p.93, L.16 - p.94, L.2; see 
State's Exs. 1, 4.) The pipe was a "blown glass pipe with a burnt portion of the bowl 
and a white powdery residue on the inside of it." (Tr., vol. 2, p.74, Ls.13-15.) On the 
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end table between the two camp chairs were two digital scales, which, according to 
Detective Crupper, are the type "commonly used ... to weigh small quantities of illegal 
narcotics." (Tr., vol. 1, p.129, Ls.10-25; p.222, L.18-p.223, L.7; see State's Exs. 2, 3.) 
On a shelf in the master bedroom closet, Detective Pittz found what appeared to be 
marijuana and "some pills." (Tr., vol. 1, p.134, Ls.1-9.) 
Detective Pittz searched a drawer of a two-drawer dresser in the master 
bedroom and found some court paperwork with Tesha Sunday's name on it, and a 
"spoon that had some white residue on it in the same drawer as the paperwork." (Tr., 
vol. 1, p.128, Ls.9-12; p.138, Ls.16-21.) The spoon, which was "a measuring spoon, a 
metal measuring spoon, teaspoon," subsequently tested negative for the presence of 
methamphetamine and heroin. (Tr., vol. 2, p.40, L.22 - p.43, L.12; vol. 2, p.74, Ls.7-9; 
p.155, L.18-p.156, L.10.) 
Although Officer Brockbank testified that Beth Dinacola had been in the 
bathroom of the master bedroom when the search began and later took responsibility 
for "the meth pipe" (Tr., vol. 2, p.149, Ls.1-22), it was not established what meth pipe 
she was referring to, as there were clearly at least two pipes located during the search; 
Detective Crupper testified that his role during the search of Mr. Reid's home was to 
secure the residence and take photographs, and he recalled taking photographs of at 
least two glass pipes. (Tr., vol. 1, p.150, Ls.16-17; p.154, L.24- p.155, L.B.) According 
to Officer Brockbank, three other people in the residence were charged with offenses. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.77, Ls.11-14.) 
The defense called Paul Reid and Tyler Nourse as its only witnesses - both of 
whom had prior convictions, and were in custody at the time of trial, for crimes of 
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dishonesty. (Tr., vol. 2, p.123, Ls.12-18; p.130, L.23 - p.131, L.1.) Paul Reid testified 
that Sunday had been staying in the master bedroom with Hannibal Escobar, known as 
"Monkey" (see Def s. Ex. A), for "about a week or so" before the search warrant was 
served. (Tr., vol. 2, p.124, L.25 - p.125, L.24; p. 127, Ls.20-25.) He also stated that 
Sunday smoked "Camel Crushes." (Tr., vol. 2, p.126, Ls.1-6.) Tyler Nourse, Sunday's 
son, testified that the day of the search was the first day Sunday had stayed in the 
master bedroom, but she wasn't really staying in that room, she was actually staying in 
the living room. (Tr., vol. 2, p.130, L.23 - p.131, L.11; p. 133, Ls.4-10.) Nourse 
explained that his mother's wallet was found on the master bedroom bed because he 
had seen it in her often-borrowed Blazer, and took it from the vehicle and placed it on 
the bed for safekeeping. (Tr., vol. 2, p.134, Ls.8-19.) In the following discourse, Nourse 
contradicted Sunday's reported statement that she had been staying in the master 
bedroom for a few days before the house was searched: 
Q. Are you aware that the - Miss Sunday admitted to living in that 
room? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Would that surprise you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Did she live in there, then? 
A. No. 
Q. Then why would she tell the officers that she lived there? 
A. I don't know. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.138, Ls.3-12.) 
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In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Sunday 
was in possession, or constructive possession, of the methamphetamine and pipe found 
in the Camel cigarette pick next to the bed in the master bedroom she was staying in, 
including the following: 
(a) Sunday admitted she had been staying in that master bedroom for 
a few days and that she had her belongings in that room; 
(b) the methamphetamine and pipe found inside the Camel cigarette 
pack was about two feet from Sunday's purse, wallet, and 
identification card on the bed; 
(c) According to Reid, Sunday smoked cigarettes, and although he 
said she smoked Camel "Crunches," she reportedly smoked a sub-
brand of the same major brand of cigarettes (i.e., "Camel") that held 
the methamphetamine and meth pipe; 
(d) a dresser drawer in the master bedroom contained Sunday's court 
papers and a measuring spoon, which, although testing negative 
for methamphetamine and heroin, had white residue on it; 
(e) Two other measuring devices -- digital scales -- were found on the 
end table close to the bed Sunday was using; 
(f) women's intimate apparel is visible on the camp chair situated 
between the bed and the Camel cigarette pack that held the meth 
pipe and methamphetamine; and 
(g) in the "I am sorry" document, prominently posted in the living room 
common area of the house, the author stated that he had been 
sharing all his "cash, food, drugs, house and love" with the other 
residents. 
The testimony presented at trial provided substantial evidence whereby a jury 
could have reasonably concluded Sunday knew about the presence of the 
methamphetamine and pipe in the Camel cigarette carton, and either had physical 
control of the items or the power and intention to control them. Consequently, there is 
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no basis for Sunday's contention that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of 
those charges. 
II. 
Sunday Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Sunday contends that the district court erred by declining to give two of her 
requested jury instructions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) She contends that the court 
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on (1) the principle that "mere proximity to 
contraband cannot establish constructive possession," and (2) Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instruction ("ICJI") 305 regarding the "union of act and intent." (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-
13.) Sunday's claims of instructional error are without merit. First, the district court 
correctly determined that Sunday was not entitled to a "mere proximity" instruction 
because the latest version of ICJI 421 provides all the definition necessary for 
distinguishing between actual and constructive possession and sole and joint 
possession. Next, the district court properly used its discretion in refusing to instruct the 
jury on ICJI 305 because to do so when one of the charges was a specific intent crime 
would have confused the jury. Even if the court erred by refusing to give one or both of 
the requested instructions, any such error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district court in its 
intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and is incorporated 
herein by reference. Whether the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly 
and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over 
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which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 
P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966,971 (1996). 
C. Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing Her "Mere 
Proximity" Instruction 
In denying Sunday's request to have the jury instructed that mere proximity to a 
controlled substance is not sufficient to prove possession, the district court explained: 
I'm giving the instruction on the possession of a controlled substance for 
both the marijuana and the meth. And I've reviewed those comments. 
I've also reviewed the definition of possession contained in the new IDJI 
[sic] 421, which cites State versus Seitter, S-E-1-T-T-E-R, 127 Idaho 356, 
which apparently is an Idaho Supreme Court case which says, "there is no 
need to attempt to distinguish further between actual and constructive 
possession and sole or joint possession." And that case was decided 
subsequent to any of the three cases that you have cited in your 
requested instructions. Those are at 1980 - 1993, 1989 and 1987, 
whereas, the Seitter case is 1995, apparently an Idaho Supreme Court 
case. 
So I will note your objection, and I'm going to decline to give those 
instructions. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.175, L.22 - p. 176, L.13.) Sunday's trial counsel stated that the case he 
was relying upon to explain constructive possession was a 1997 case (Tr., vol. 2, p.176, 
Ls.17-19), and the court responded that, inasmuch as the Supreme Court promulgated 
new criminal jury instructions on September 1, of 2010, "those are the instructions that 
the Court is going to give." (Tr., vol. 2, p.176, Ls.20-25.) The court was correct to do 
so. 
The district court correctly observed that the latest version of the Idaho Criminal 
Jury Instructions went into effect on September 1, 2010. (See ICJI, Order of Aug. 26, 
2010 by Chief Justice Daniel T. Eismann.) As the court related, one of the comments to 
ICJI 421 reads, "There is no need to attempt to distinguish further between actual and 
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constructive possession and sole and joint possession[,]" citing State v. Seitter, 127 
Idaho 356,900 P.2d 1367 (1995). (Tr., vol. 2, p.176, Ls.20-25; ICJI 421.) Although ICJI 
421 does not state that mere presence is not enough to find a person in "possession" of 
a controlled substance, it sets out what is required, as follows: 
A person has possession of something it the person knows of its 
presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to 
control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if 
each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. 
ICJI 421 (see Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-15). The pattern ICJI instructions are 
presumptively correct. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 376, 92 P.3d 704, 
707 (Ct. App. 2004); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 
(2010) (citations omitted). By requiring proof that a person both know of a controlled 
substance's presence and have physical control (or the power and intention to control 
it), ICJI 421 makes it clear that a defendant's mere presence is not enough to prove 
possession. Sunday has failed to show any error in the district court's following the 
most recent rendition of ICJI 421, and its comment that no further definition is 
necessary. 
D. Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing To Give ICJI 
305 On Union Or Joint Operation Of Act And Intent 
During the jury instruction hearing, Sunday asked the district court to instruct the 
jury according to ICJI 305, which states (as applied here), "In every crime or public 
offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." (Tr., vol. 2, p.170, 
L.13 - p.172, L.4.) The court first noted that the comments to ICJI 305 indicate it is only 
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applicable to general intent crimes, 1 and one of the crimes charged - possession of 
drug paraphernalia - is a specific intent crime.2 (Id.) The court then declined to give 
the requested instruction, and explained, "one of the charges is a specific intent crime 
and the Court believes it would be confusing and misleading to the jury." (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.172, Ls.8-13.) 
Not only was the district court correct to point out that the "union/joint operation" 
instruction might have confused the jury in regard to the misdemeanor charge of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, in this situation it would also have confused the jury 
in its consideration of whether Sunday constructively possessed the methamphetamine 
found in the Camel cigarette pack in the master bedroom. The court properly instructed 
the jury (in relevant part), "A person has possession of something if the person knows of 
its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it." 
1 The Comment to ICJI 305 explains: 
The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely 
the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal 
negligence the failure to perform the required act. State v. Parish, 79 
Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957); State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 375 P.2d 
536 (1962). The term "criminal negligence", means gross negligence, 
such as amounts to reckless disregard of consequences and the rights of 
others. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (construing 
former I.C. s 17 114 which was identical to s 18 114). 
This instruction is unnecessary when the crime charged requires a specific 
mental element and the jury is properly instructed regarding that mental 
element. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002). 
2 Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime, "that is, the knowledge 
that one is in possession of the substance[,]" not that the substance was illegal. State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). In contrast, I.C. § 37-2734A 
makes it "unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a 
controlled substance." 
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(Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) The "intent" (or knowledge) requirement 
of possession of a controlled substance is that the "person knows of its presence." 
When the possession is by "physical control," then that is the "act" that must be in 
"union or joint operation" with the intent. However, where, as here, "constructive 
possession" is the basis for the offense, the "act" includes "intent" language - i.e., 
having "the power and intention to control it" -- that could easily confuse a jury 
attempting to decide if there "exist[sJ a union or joint operation of act and intent." 
Moreover, the district court's instruction that a person has possession of something "if 
the person knows of its presence and has . .. the power and intention to control it" (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added)) strongly suggests that the act and intent must 
occur simultaneously. Sunday has failed to show that the district court erred in refusing 
to instruct the jury on ICJI 305. 
Even if the district court erred in refusing to give ICJI 305, for the same reasons 
set forth above, and in reviewing the instructions as a whole, such an error would not 
have misled the jury or prejudiced Sunday's case. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 
373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 
P.3d 144, 147 (2005) ("An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error 
unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.") 
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CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm Sunday's convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 20 3. 
J HN C. McKINN Y 
Deputy Attorney General 
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